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No. 20060593-CA

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MOISES M. MORALES & LISA M. MORALES,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,

Defendant-Appellee.

Brief of Appellees

Statement of Jurisdiction
This matter comes within the appellate jurisdiction of the Utah
Supreme Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (West 2004) because this
is an appeal from a judgment of a court of record over which this Court does
not have original appellate jurisdiction. On July 6, 2006, the matter was
transferred to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004).

Issues Presented
1. Waiver
The Plaintiffs' opening brief discusses only the dismissal of Moises
Morales's claims. It does not contain any analysis of the dismissal of Lisa
Morales's claims. Have Plaintiffs waived Lisa Morales's claim in its entirety?

A. Standard of Review
Generally, any issues "not presented in the opening brief are considered
waived and will not be considered by the appellate court." Brown v. Glover,
2000 UT 89,123, 16 P.3d 540.

B. Preservation of the Issue
This issue is unique to this appeal and does not require a review of the
district court's decision.

2. Compliance with the immunity act
Although the State offered to settle part of Moises's claim, the parties
never reached an agreement to settle the entire claim in the ninety days after
Moises submitted his notice of claim. By operation of law, the claim was

2

deemed denied. The immunity act requires a plaintiff to bring suit within one
year after the denial of a claim. This action was not brought until nineteen
months after the claim was denied. Is the action barred by the immunity act?

A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the granting of a motion to dismiss for correctness,
affording no deference to the district court. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St.
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194,196 (Utah 1991).

B. Preservation of the Issue
This issue was raised in the State's motion to dismiss and
accompanying memoranda. R. 6-37; 95-101.

Determinative Constitutional
Provisions, Statutes and Rules
The following provisions are attached in Addendum 3:
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15

3

Statement of the Case
1.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a final order of the district court granting the

State's motion to dismiss under Utah's governmental immunity act. Plaintiffs
brought this negligence action to recover damages sustained in an automobile
accident.

2.

Course of the Proceedings Below
Plaintiffs Moises Morales and Lisa Morales brought this negligence

action against the State of Utah by filing a complaint on September 29, 2005.
R. 1-5. Moises sought damages for injuries he sustained in an automobile
accident. R. 2-4. Lisa, his wife, sought damages for loss of consortium. R. 2.
The State filed a motion to dismiss, with supporting memorandum,
based on the Utah governmental immunity act's one-year limitation on
bringing suit. R. 6-37; 95-101. The district court granted the motion to
dismiss, concluding that this action was barred because it was commenced
well outside the immunity act's one-year limit. R. 113. The district court
rejected the Morales's argument that the State was estopped from relying on
the one-year limit, concluding that correspondence from the State's insurance

4

adjuster did not induce them to delay the filing of their lawsuit and did not
lull them into a false sense of security. R. 112-13. The district court further
concluded that Lisa Morales's claim was barred because she failed to file a
notice of claim, a jurisdictional precondition to bringing suit. R. 112.
The Moraleses then filed this appeal. R. 131.

3.

Disposition Below
The district court entered a memorandum decision on May 22, 2006,

granting the State's motion to dismiss and directing the State to prepare a
final order. R. 111-16. The final order of dismissal was entered June 12, 2006.
R. 120-22.

Statement of Facts
In 2003, Moises Morales was significantly injured when his motorcycle
collided with a vehicle owned by the State of Utah and driven by a State
employee. R. 5.
On December 15, 2003, Mr. Morales properly filed a notice of claim with
the State. R. 11-31. His wife, Lisa Morales, never filed a notice of claim.
R. 8-9.
On December 22, 2003, the State's insurance adjuster sent a letter to
5

the Morales's attorney. R. 49 (attached as Addendum 1). The letter
acknowledged the attorney's representation of the Moraleses and stated: "We
are continuing our investigation into this incident. Once our investigation is
complete we will be in a position to make a firm decision on any coverage and
liability issues." R. 49. The letter concluded by stating: "This letter does not
constitute a waiver of any provisions or requirements of the Governmental
Immunity Act. . . nor does it confirm or verify the sufficiency of the
claimant's notice of claim as required by the Act." R. 49.
On May 22, 2004, the Morales's attorney sent a letter to the State's
adjuster, asking whether the State's investigation was complete and whether
the State had made a decision on liability and coverage. R. 46.
On May 26, 2004, the adjuster responded with another letter. R. 44
(attached as Addendum 2). The adjuster stated: "We are willing to consider
any settlement offers you may present on behalf of your client." R. 44. He also
offered to settle the property damage portion of the claim under the same
terms he had previously offered before the Moraleses had retained counsel.
R. 44. Regarding the bodily injury portion of the claim, however, the adjuster
stated: "Once Mr. Morales reaches an appropriate stage in his recovery!,] I'd
welcome obtaining any information you feel might help us in evaluating and
settling his bodily injury claim." R. 44. This letter concluded, as did the first
6

letter, with this statement: "This letter does not constitute a waiver of any
provisions or requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act. . . nor does it
confirm or verify the sufficiency of the claimant's notice of claim as required
by the Act/' R. 44.
After this May 26th letter, no other communication took place between
the parties until this lawsuit was filed sixteen months later, on September 29,
2005. R. 1-5.

Summary of the Argument
Lisa Morales's claim has been waived in its entirety because Plaintiffs'
opening brief does not contain any discussion of the district court's dismissal
of her claim.
Moises Morales's claim was correctly dismissed by the district court
because this action was not filed within the strict time limit in Utah's
governmental immunity act. Moises points to no ambiguity in the immunity
act that would relieve him of this strict time limit. In fact, the statute is clear
that suit must be filed within one year of the denial of the claim. And
although the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in Davis v. Central Utah
Counseling Center does not make it clear whether collateral estoppel can ever
apply without ambiguity in the statutory language, Moises has failed
7

nevertheless to demonstrate that estoppel should apply in this case to relieve
him of the one-year time limit.
Because the district court correctly concluded that this action was
untimely, this Court should affirm the district court's order of dismissal.

Argument
1. Lisa Morales's claim has been waived.
Plaintiffs have waived Lisa Morales's claim in its entirety by failing to
brief the issue. The argument in their opening brief is limited to only Moises
Morales's claim and does not contain any discussion of the dismissal of Lisa
Morales's claim. Generally, any issues "that were not presented in the
opening brief are considered waived and will not be considered by the
appellate court." Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, H23, 16 P.3d 540. Accordingly,
this Court should affirm the district court's dismissal of Lisa Morales's claim.

2. This action is untimely because it was not filed within a year of the
State's denial of the claim.
The Utah Supreme Court has "consistently and uniformly held that suit
may not be brought against the state or its subdivisions unless the
requirements of the Governmental Immunity act are strictly followed." Hall
8

u. Dep't ofCorrs., 2001 UT 34,123, 24 P.3d 958. Stringent enforcement is
mandated because it is through the immunity act that the "legislature has
recognized the necessity of immunity as essential to the protection of the
state in rendering the many and ever increasing number of governmental
services/" Id. at 114 (quoting Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976)).
"Applying this rule of strict compliance, [the Utah Supreme Court has]
repeatedly denied recourse to parties that have even slightly diverged from
the exactness required by the Immunity Act." Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT
16, f 12, 40 P.3d 632.
The immunity act's one-year statute of limitation bars this action
because it was not timely filed. Moises's notice of claim was filed on December
15, 2003, the date it was postmarked. R. 12. His claim was deemed denied
ninety days later, on March 15, 2004, because it was neither denied nor
approved. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-14 (West 2004)1 (stating that a[a] claim
shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end of the ninety-day period the
governmental entity or its insurance carrier has failed to approve or deny the '
claim"). After this deemed denial of his claim, the immunity act required that

because the alleged injury here arose before July 1, 2004, this action is
"governed by the provisions of Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental
Immunity Act." 2004 Laws of Utah ch. 267, § 48. Accordingly, this brief cites
to those provisions.
9

Moises bring his lawsuit within one year, or by March 15, 2005. See Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-15 (West 2004) (stating that a "claimant shall begin the
action within one year after denial of the claim or within one year after the
denial period specified in this chapter has expired"). Because this case was
not initiated until September 29, 2005 - over seven months after the one-year
deadline had passed - Moises's claim is barred by the plain language of the
immunity act. See Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, SI SI 11 & 13, 67
P.3d 466 (affirming trial court's dismissal of case that was filed outside the
one-year limit); see also Wagner v. State, 2005 UT 54, SI 10, 122 P.3d 599
(stating that courts look first to the immunity act's plain language and go no
further unless the language is ambiguous).
Moises should be held to strict compliance with the immunity act
because he failed to demonstrate that any ambiguity in the act would relieve
him of the act's strict requirements. In Davis v. Central Utah Counseling
Center, the Utah Supreme Court recently held that an exception to strict
compliance with the immunity act's provisions will be allowed only a in cases
which depended upon ambiguities" in the act. 2006 UT 52, SI 44, 147 P.3d 390.
Further, a plaintiff must "exercise the diligence necessary to effect strict
compliance" with the act. Id. at SI 48. Where a plaintiff fails to exercise due
diligence, the Court declined "to recognize an exception to the requirement of
10

strict compliance/' Id. Instead, "'where, as here, the statute is clear, readily
available, and easily accessible by counsel, there is no reason to require
anything less than strict compliance/" Id. at \ 49 (quoting Greene v. Utah
Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109, f 14, 37 P.3d 1156). Significantly, the Davis
Court noted that even allegedly "intentionally misleading behavior" by the
State that leads a plaintiff to fail to comply with the immunity act will not
excuse strict compliance. Id. at 45 (quoting Greene at f 19). Although the
adjuster's correspondence in this case is not even close to misleading, Moises
would still be held to the strict one-year deadline even if the letters were
misleading.
Based on the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Davis requiring
ambiguity in the immunity act before a party is relieved of its obligation to
strictly comply with the act's requirements, it is not clear whether the
traditional estoppel test advanced by Moises applies to an unambiguous
provision. But even if it does apply, Moises's estoppel argument fails for two
reasons. First, he has failed to demonstrate that this case qualifies as an
exception to the general rule that estoppel may not be invoked against a
governmental entity. And, second, he has also failed to demonstrate that the
elements of estoppel were present in this case.
First, Moises's estoppel argument fails because he cannot demonstrate
11

that this case qualifies as an exception to the general rule that estoppel may
not be invoked against a governmental entity. See Anderson v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992) (stating that, "[a]s a general rule,
estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental entity"). A limited
exception to this general rule applies "only if the facts may be found with
such certainty and the injustice suffered is of sufficient gravity to invoke the
exception/' Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moises's
argument is based on the incorrect premise that the adjuster's
correspondence amounted to an approval of his entire claim and therefore
Moises was lulled into postponing suit. This premise is simply wrong because
it grossly mischaracterizes the correspondence.
As the district court correctly noted, the State adjuster's May 26th
letter cannot be reasonably construed as an approval of the entire claim. The
adjuster stated generally, regarding the entire claim: "We are willing to
consider any settlement offers you may present on behalf of your client." R. 44
(attached as Addendum 2). He then renewed a previous offer to settle the
property damage portion of the claim: "I believe it would be appropriate to
conclude the property damage portion of the claim as soon as possible. I'd be
willing to resolve that portion of the claim as outlined [previously!." R. 44
(emphasis added). But then the adjuster expressly left open the bodily injury
12

portion of the claim: "I'd welcome obtaining any information you feel might
help us in evaluating and settling his bodily injury claim." R. 44. The adjuster
also stated, as he had done in his previous letter, that none of the
requirements of the immunity act were waived. And he even pointed counsel
to the sections of Utah Code where the immunity act was located.
Significantly, the offer to settle the property damage portion of the claim
came without an admission of liability and without an explanation of the
reasons behind the settlement offer. It was simply an offer to settle one
portion of the claim, not an acceptance of the entire claim.2
Because the most significant portion of the claim was still unresolved, it
was unreasonable for Moises to not file suit in the nearly ten months he had
remaining before the one-year deadline passed. Because the adjuster's
correspondence clearly communicated without deception that the bodily
injury portion of the claim remained unresolved, any injustice worked on
Moises by not being able to litigate his claim is not due to the State's conduct.
Where the immunity act's requirements are clear, "it is really those parties

2

If, as Moises suggests, the May 26th letter was an approval of the
entire claim, then the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case since
the immunity act allows suit to be brought only after denial of a claim. See
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15(1) (West 2004) (stating that "[i}f the claim is
denied, a claimant may institute an action in district court"). The act does not
authorize a suit for approved claims.
13

who fail to follow the express provisions of the statute correctly that prevent
justice, not the strict compliance rule." Wheeler\ 2002 UT 16, \ 12. Therefore,
this case does not qualify as an exception to the general rule that estoppel
may not be invoked against the State.
Second, Moises's estoppel argument fails because he cannot
demonstrate that the elements of estoppel are satisfied. Those elements are:
(a) "a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one
party inconsistent with a claim later asserted";
(b) "reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken
or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement"; and
(c) "injury to the second party that would result from
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement,
admission, act, or failure to act."
CECO u. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989).
Because the May 26th letter was not an approval of Moises's claim, the
State's position now that the claim was deemed denied is not inconsistent
with any prior position. The first element is therefore not met.
Nor is the second element met. Moises's inaction was unreasonable. He
should have filed his suit within the year when bodily injury portion of the
claim was clearly unresolved. His inaction was even more unreasonable since
14

he was represented by counsel who was not only charged with a full
knowledge of the strict requirements of the immunity act but was expressly
told that none of the immunity act's requirements were waived. The State did
not lull Moises into inaction because: (1) the correspondence from the State's
insurance adjuster could not reasonably be construed as an approval of the
claim; (2) Moises was represented by counsel who was charged with an
understanding of the plain requirements of the immunity act; and (3) the
correspondence contained an express statement that none of the provisions of
the immunity act were waived. Nevertheless, even if the State lulled Moises
into delaying suit, the Utah Supreme Court has upheld dismissal of a suit for
noncompliance in spite of the State's allegedly misleading conduct. Greene,
2001 UT 109 at ff 17-19.
The case law cited by Moises does not support his estoppel argument.
Unlike Rice v. Granite School District, 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969), the adjuster
here never promised full compensation for the Moises's injuries, either one
time or several. And unlike Whitaker v. Salt Lake City Corp., 522 P.2d 1252
(Utah 1974), the State here never admitted liability. The offer to settle the
property damage portion of the claim came without an admission of liability
and without an explanation of the motivations behind the settlement offer.
And, contrary to the facts of Whitaker, the adjuster here never promised that
15

a settlement offer would be forthcoming. Instead, he indicated that he
welcomed any settlement demand Moises might be inclined to make. R. 44.

Conclusion
Because Plaintiffs' opening brief contains no discussion of Lisa
Morales's claim, that claim has been waived on appeal. The district court
correctly dismissed Moises Morales's claim because he failed to bring this
action within the immunity act's strict one-year limitations period. Because
the statute is unambiguous, Moises should not be relieved from this time
limit. Although it is not clear after Davis whether collateral estoppel can ever
apply without statutory ambiguity, Moises has failed, in any event, to
demonstrate that estoppel should apply. Accordingly, the district court
properly concluded that this action was untimely under the immunity act,
and the State asks this Court should affirm the district court's order of
dismissal.
Dated this J_

day of May, 2007.

J. CLIFFORD PETERSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for the State of Utah
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Certificate of Service
This is to certify that I mailed TWO copies of the foregoing Brief of
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Michael P. Studebaker
Law Offices of Michael Studebaker, LLC
2550 Washington Blvd., Suite 331
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Addendum 1
Letter from State adjuster dated December 22, 2003
(R. 49)

Michael O. Leavitt

1 Department of Administrative Services
j Division of Risk Management

Governor <

S. Camille Anthony !
Executive Director
Alan Edwards
Risk Manager

\
|
i

5120 State Office Building • Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
(801) 538-9560 • FAX (801) 538-9597 • www.nsk utah.gov

December 22, 2003

Jose A. Loayza Esq.
7321 South State Street, Suite A
Midvale, Utah 84047

Re: Letter of Representation- Moises Morales Our file #45453

Dear Mr. Loayza:

This letter will acknowledge receipt of your letter of representation on behalf of Mr.
Morales in this matter. I appreciate your letter and look forward to working with you and
your client toward a resolution of this matter.
We are continuing our investigation into this incident. Once our investigation is complete
we will be in a position to make a firm decision on any coverage and liability issues.
With regard to your question regarding liability policy limits, The State of Utah's liability
limits are clearly outlined in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Please feel free to contact me directly if you have any questions or concerns. 1 can be
reached at 801-538-9560 during business hours.
This letter does not constitute a waiver of any provisions or requirements of the
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 63-30-1 et seq, nor does it confirm or
verify the sufficiency of the claimant's notice of claim as required by that Act.
Sincerely,

Coates
ms Adjuster

Utah!

nrufl

Addendum 2
Letter from State adjuster dated May 26, 2004
(R. 44)

DepartL

of Administrative Services

S CAMILLB ANTHONY
Executive Director

•--if

State of Utah

Division of Risk Management
A L A N EDWARDS
Dire i lor

O L k N h S WALKRR
Governor
G A Y L h McKHACHNlE
Lieutenant Governor

Jose A. Loayza Esq.
7321 South State Street, Suite A
Midvale, Utah 84047
May 26, 2004
RE: Your Client: Moises Morales
Our File #45453
Date of Loss: 10/12/03
Dear Mr. Loayza,
Thank you for your recent letter updating me on your client's condition. I'm glad he is
continuing to do better.
We are willing to consider any settlement offers you may present on behalf of your client.
I believe it would be appropriate to conclude the property damage portion of the claim as
soon as possible. I'd be willing to resolve that portion of the claim as outlined in my letter
to your client on November 13, 2003. Of course the date of that letter is prior to your
Letter of Representation dated December 4, 2003. If you,or your client do not have a
copy of that settlement offer, please advise and I'll forward another copy to you for your
consideration.
Once Mr. Morales reaches an appropriate stage in his recovery I'd welcome obtaining
any information you feel might help us in evaluating and settling his bodily injury claim.
I look forward to working with you to resolve these matters. I can be reached at 801538-9560 during business hours.
This letter does not constitute a waiver of any provisions or requirements of the
Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. 63-30-1 et seq, nor does it confirm or
verify the sufficiency of the claimant's notice of claim as required by that Act.
Sincerely.

cff Coates
Claims Adjuster

5120 Slate Office Building. Salt Lake City, Utah 84! 14 • telephone 801-5^8-9560 • lacsimile 801-538-9597 • www.risk utah gov

Utah!
Wfiere ideas

conned

Addendum 3
Determinative Statutes

STATE AFFAIRS

§ 63-30-11. Claim for injury—Notice—Conentity may file a request with the court for the
tents—Service—Legal disability—Appointment
appointment of a guardian ad litem for the
potential claimant.
of guardian ad litem
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limita(ii) If a guardian ad litem is appointed undei
tions that would apply if the claim were against
this Subsection (4)(d), the time for filing a claim
under Sections 63-30-12 and 63-30-13 begins
a private person begins to run.
when the order appointing the guardian is is(2) Any person having a claim for injur}'
sued.
against a governmental entity, or against its
employee for an act or omission occurring durLaws 1965, c. 139, § 11; Laws 1978, c. 27,
ing the performance of the employee's duties,
§ 5; Laws 1983, c. 131, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 75,
within the scope of employment, or under color
§ 4; Laws 1991, c. 76, § 6; Laws 1998, c. 164,
of authority shall file a written notice of claim
§ 1, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2000, c. 157, § 1,
with the entity before maintaining an action,
eff. July 1,2001.
regardless of whether or not the function giving
See, now, § 63-30d-401.
rise to the claim is characterized as governmen§ 63-30-12. Claim against state or its employtal.
ee—Time for filing notice
(3)(a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
A claim against the state, or against its em(i) a brief statement of the facts;
ployee for an act or omission occurring during
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
the performance of the employee's duties, with(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so
in the scope of employment, or under color of
far as they are known.
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
filed with the attorney general within one year
(i) signed by the person making the claim or
after the claim arises, or before the expiration of
that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal
any extension of time granted under Section
guardian; and
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the
(ii) directed and delivered to:
function giving rise to the claim is characterized
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim
as governmental.
is against an incorporated city or town;
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 12; Laws 1978, c. 27,
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is
§ 6; Laws 1983, c. 131, § 2; Laws 1987, c. 75,
§ 5; Laws 1998, c. 164, § 2, eff. May 4, 1998.
against a county;
(C) the superintendent or business adminisSee, now, § 63-30d-402.
trator of the board, when the claim is against a
§
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivischool district or board of education;
sion
or its employee—Time for filing notice
(D) the president or secretary of the board,
A claim against a political subdivision, or
when the claim is against a special district;
against its employee for an act or omission
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is
occurring during the performance of the emagainst the State of Utah; or
ployee's duties, within the scope of employment,
(F) a member of the governing board, the
or iunder color of authority, is barred unless
executive director, or executive secretary, when
notice of claim is filed with the governing body
the claim is against any other public board,
of the political subdivision according to the recommission, or body.
quirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year
(4)(a) If the claimant is under the age of
after the claim arises, or before the expiration of
majority, or mentally incompetent and without
any extension of time granted under Section
a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the
claimant may apply to the court to extend the
function giving rise to the claim is characterized
time for service of notice of claim.
as governmental.
(b)(i) After hearing and notice to the governLaws 1965, c. 139, § 13; Laws 1978, c. 27,
mental entity, the court may extend the time for
§ 7; Laws 1983, c. 131, § 3; Laws 1987, c. 75,
service of notice of claim.
§ 6; Laws 1998, c. 164, § 3, eff. May 4, 1998;
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that
See, now, § 63-30d-402.
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an
§ 63-30-14. Claim for injury—Approval or
extension, the court shall consider whether the
denial by governmental entity or insurance carrier within ninety days
delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in mainWithin ninety days of the filing of a claim the
taining its defense on the merits.
governmental entity or its insurance carrier
(d)(i) If an injury that may reasonably be exshall act thereon and notify the claimant in
pected to result in a claim against a governmenwriting of its approval or denial. A claim shall
be deemed to have been denied if at the end of
tal entity is sustained by a potential claimant
the ninety-day period the governmental entity or
described in Subsection (4)(a), that government
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its insurance carrier has failed to approve or
deny the claim.
Laws J 965, c. 139, § 14.
See, now, § 63-30d-403.
§ 63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury—Authority and time for filing action against governmental entity
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may
institute an action in the district court against
the governmental entity or an employee of the
entity.
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within
one year after denial of the claim or within one
year after the denial period specified in this
chapter has expired, regardless of whether or
not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 15; Laws 1983, c. 129,
§ 6; Laws 1985, c. 82, § 2; Laws 1987, c. 75,
§7.
See, now, § 63-30d-403.
§ 63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts
over actions—Application of Rules of Civil Procedure
(1) The district courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over any action brought
under this chapter.
(2) An action brought under this chapter may
not be tried as a small claims action and shall
be governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent they are consistent with this
chapter.
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 16; Laws 1983, c. 1*29,
§ 7; Laws 1999, c. 166, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999.
See, now, §§ 63-30d-501 and 63-30d-601.
§ 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 7 . Venue of actions
Actions against the state may be brought in
the county in which the claim arose or in Salt
Lake County. Actions against a county may be
brought in the county in which the claim arose,
or in the defendant county, or, upon leave
granted by a district court judge of the defendant county, in any county contiguous to the
defendant county. Leave may be granted ex
parte. Actions against all other political subdivisions including cities and towns, shall be
brought in the county in which the political
subdivision is located or in the county in which
the claim arose.
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 17; Laws 1983, c. 129,
§8.
See, now, § 63-30d-502.
§ 63-30-18. Compromise and settlement of
actions
(1) A political subdivision, after conferring
with its legal officer or other legal counsel if it
does not have a legal officer, may compromise

and settle any action as to the damages or other
relief sought.
(2) The risk manager in the Department of
Administrative Services may:
(a) compromise and settle any claim of
$25,000 or less in damages filed against the
state for which the Risk Management Fund may
be liable;
(b) with the concurrence of the attorney general or his representative and the executive director of the Department of Administrative Services, compromise and settle any claim of
$25,000 to $100,000 in damages for which the
Risk Management Fund may be liable; and
(3) The risk manager shall comply with procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter
38b, in compromising and settling any claim of
$100,000 or more.
See, now, § 63-30d-602.
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 18; Laws 1981, c. 250,
§ 6; Laws 1983, c. 303, § 2; Laws 1983, c. 320,
§ 54; Laws 1990, c. 97, § 9; Laws 1995, c. 313,
§ 1, eff. May 1, 1995.
§ 63-30-19. Undertaking required of plaintiff
in action
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff
shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the
court, but in no case less than the sum of $300,
conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of
taxable costs incurred by the governmental entity in the action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute
the action or fails to recover judgment.
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 19.
See, now, § 63-30d-60J.
§ 63-30-20. Judgment against governmental
entity bars action against employee
Judgment against a governmental entity in an
action brought under this act shall constitute a
complete bar to any action by the claimant, by
reason of the same subject matter, against the
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim.
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 20.
See, now, § 63-30d-202.
§ 63-30-21. Repealed by Laws 1978, c. 27,
§ 12
§ 63-30-22. Exemplary or punitive damages
prohibited—Governmental entity exempt from
execution, attachment, or garnishment
(l)(a) No judgment may be rendered against
the governmental entity for exemplary or punitive damages.
(b) The state shall pay any judgment or portion of any judgment entered against a state
employee in the employee's personal capacity
even if the judgment is for or includes exemplary or punitive damages if the state would be

